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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES FLOYD, 
Appellant, 
vs. Supreme Court No. 870284 
WESTERN SURGICAL ASSOCIATES, Case Pjriority No. 14(b) 
INC., MARTIN C. LINDEM, JR., 
M.D., LYNN L. WILCOX, M.D., and 
ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS WESTERN SURGICAL ASSOCIATES 
AND DR. MARTIN C. LINDEM 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKfe COUNTY 
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether the lower court properly determined that there 
were no genuine issues of fact and that respondents Dr. Lindem 
and Western Surgical Associates, Inc. were entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law because appellant discoyered, or through the 
use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered that he 
sustained an injury and that such injury was allegedly caused 
by negligent action more than two years before he commenced an 
action against health care providers? 
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II. Whether appellant's attempt to manufacture an issue of 
fact through his own post-deposition contradictory affidavit 
should be disregarded? 
III. Whether appellant improperly addresses the 
constitutionality of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act for 
the first time on appeal? 
IV. Whether the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1953, as amended): 
(A) bars appellant's claim for failure to bring such 
claim within two years as prescribed by the Act; 
(B) avoids characterization as a constitutionally 
defective "special law;" 
(C) satisfies constitutional requirements of the due 
process, open courts and equal protection provisions of the 
Utah Constitution, and/or the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution; and 
(D) Satisfies Constitutional requirements by ration-
ally relating and furthering to the legislative objectives 
underlying the statute? 
DISPOSITIVE STATUTORY PROVISION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a medical malpractice action brought by appellant 
Charles Floyd to recover damages for injuries he claims to have 
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sustained as the result of allegedly negligent treatment 
rendered on December 10, 1981 by Dr. Mart|in C. Lindem. (Record 
at 2-20.) 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted respondents' motion to dismiss 
appellant's complaint for the reason that appellant's claims 
are barred by the statute of limitations set forth in the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act ("The Act"), IJTtah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-4 (1987), L. 1976 ch. 23. (Record at 186-87.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Appellant Charles Floyd sought medical treatment for 
"stomach problems," diagnosed as a hiatal hernia condition 
which resulted in his hospitalization on December 9, 1981 and 
surgery by Dr. Martin C. Lindem which was conducted on 
December 10, 1981. (Record at 3-4.) 
2. Appellant testified that prior to his operation, the 
only surgical procedure that he discussed with Dr. Lindem was a 
hiatal hernia operation. Appellant also testified that 
Dr. Lindem did not ever mention any surgery for ulcer disease. 
(Record at 199; and Deposition of Charles Floyd, ("Floyd Depo.") 
at 83:14-24; 84:10-25; 85:1-5; and 88:6-9.) 
3. Appellant testified that his discussions with 
Dr. Wilcox prior to his referral to Dr. Lindem and prior to the 
operation were limited to diagnosis and treatment of a hiatal 
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hernia condition. (Record at 199; and Floyd Depo. at 111:23-25; 
112:1-25; and 113:1-4.) 
4. Based on conversations with Dr. Wilcox and Dr. Lindem, 
appellant understood, as early as November of 1981, that sur-
gery for a hiatal hernia condition (fundoplication) is limited 
to repair of "a tear between the esophagus and the stomach," 
(Record at 199; and Floyd Depo. at 83:20.) and that such 
procedure does not involve cutting nerves on the stomach, or 
enlarging the opening between the stomach and the duodenum. 
Appellant knew that fundoplication simply involves "stretch[ing] 
the stomach up over the esophagus and [tying] it in." (Record 
at 199 and Floyd Depo. at 83:16-22; 111:23-25; 112:1-25.) 
5. Appellant testified that he consented to have only the 
hiatal hernia (fundoplication) surgical procedure performed. 
(Record at 199 and Floyd Depo. at 88:6-20.) 
6. By March or April of 1982, appellant knew that 
Dr. Lindem had performed the following surgical procedures on 
December 10, 1981: (1) fundoplication (the procedure described 
by both Dr. Lindem and Dr. Wilcox of tying a portion of the 
stomach around the distal end of the esophagus to prevent 
stomach contents from going into the esophagus); (2) vagotomy 
(severance of the vagus nerves to the stomach to reduce stomach 
acid secretions to correct ulcer diseases); and (3) pyloroplasty 
(enlarging the opening from the stomach to the duodenum to 
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allow stomach contents to empty more rapidly.) (Record at 199; 
Floyd Depo., pp. 85, 88; 96:15-21; 97:2-2J5 and 98:1-2.) 
7. Appellant alleged that Dr. Lindefn performed unauthor-
ized surgical procedures and did not inform appellant of risks 
related to such procedures. (Record at 2-20.) 
8. Appellant experienced unexpected symptoms immediately 
following the surgery performed by Dr. Lindem, including 
diarrhea, stomach pain, weight loss and depression. (Record at 
116-18 and Floyd Depo. at 91:1-25; 92:1-9,) 
9. Appellant understood in March or April of 1982 that 
the unexpected symptoms he was experiencing, (diarrhea, upset 
stomach, weight loss and depression) were attributable to 
Dr. Lindem's performance of surgical procedures other than the 
hiatal hernia operation. (Record at 116-18 and Floyd Depo. at 
99-101.) 
10. In March or April of 1982, appellant discovered an 
alleged legal injury (unauthorized surgery) and attributed the 
cause thereof to alleged negligent conduct of respondents. 
(Record at 116-18 and Floyd Depo. at 96:2-25; 96:2-25; 98:1-2.) 
11. Appellant consulted Dr. Wilcox in September 1982 
because of persistent health problems which appellant allegedly 
experienced following the 1981 surgery. Appellant explained to 
Dr. Wilcox that Dr. Lindem had performed additional surgery 
(vagotomy and pyloroplasty) on him. (Recofd at 199 and Floyd 
Depo. at 99:14-25; 100:1-19.) 
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12. Dr. Wilcox was amazed to learn that Dr. Lindem had 
performed more extensive surgery than simply repairing the 
hiatal hernia. Dr. Wilcox told appellant that he had "dumping 
syndrome," which is an accelerated stomach emptying rate which 
appellant was told he should not have experienced as a result 
of a hiatal hernia operation. Dr. Wilcox also informed 
appellant that surgery might be necessary to resolve the 
dumping syndrome problem. (Record at 118, 199 and Floyd Depo. 
at 99:14-25; 100:1; 101:9-11; 117 and 118.) 
13. Despite the fact that, in 1982, appellant was aware of 
injuries and symptoms relating to allegedly unauthorized sur-
gery and their cause, he failed to commence this action until 
November 27, 1985, more than two years after the appellant 
discovered or through the use of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered his legal injuries and their possible cause. 
(Record at 4.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly ruled, as a matter of law, that 
the claims of appellant Charles Floyd are completely time-
barred by the two year statute of limitations contained in Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1987). Appellant's own testimony demon-
strates discovery of an alleged injury and its cause more than 
two years prior to commencement of this action against health 
care providers. Nothing more is required to begin the running 
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of the applicable two year statute of limitations. In spite of 
these acknowledged discoveries, appellant did not commence the 
instant action until more than three years had elapsed. 
Appellant cannot enliven his stale claim by asserting that 
the health care providers involved indicated that appellant's 
condition would improve with time or that appellant did know 
the full extent of his injuries because "[t]o adopt such 
reasoning would, in practical effect, wipe out the statute." 
Magoc v. Hooker, 796 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1986). Likewise, 
appellant's attempts to manufacture an issue of fact through 
unexplained post deposition contradictions should not be 
considered. "A contrary rule would undermine the utility of 
summary judgment as a means for screening out sham issues of 
fact." Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983). 
When appellant learned of information that would lead to the 
discovery of the cause of action through diligence, the statue 
of limitations begins to run regardless of concealment. 
Appellant cannot create issues of fact through contradition. 
Because appellant knew or should have known that he suffered 
an alleged legal injury, the trial court's application of 
Section 78-14-4 to time bar appellant's cause of action is 
wholly consistent with this Court's decision in Foil v. 
Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979). 
Finally, because appeallant failed to present any constitu-
tional argument to the trial court, this Court cannot consider 
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such arguments for the first time on appeal. Nevertheless, 
Section 78-14-4 is a constitutionally valid enactment, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY ENTERED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENTS BECAUSE APPELLANT'S 
CLAIMS ARE ABSOLUTELY TIME-BARRED BY SECTION 
78-14-4 OF THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE 
ACT. 
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine 
dispute as to a material fact and if the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Horgan v. Industrial Design 
Corp. , 657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 1982). See also Celotex Corp. 
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). In the instant case, the 
trial court granted respondents1 Motion for Summary Judgment, 
ruling that appellant's claim should be dismissed because he: 
discovered or through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have discovered that he had sustained 
an injury and that the injury was caused by negligent 
action more than two years before he commenced an 
action against the health care providers. . . . 
(Record at 186-87.) See Addendum at A-l 
A. Appellant's Claims Are Completely Time-Barred Because, 
By Appellant's Own Admission, He Had Knowledge Of The 
Performance Of Allegedly Unauthorized Surgical 
Procedures More Than Two Years Prior To Commencement 
Of This Action. 
The relevant limitation section of the Act codified in Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1987) and upon which the trial courts' 
Order of judgment was based states: 
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No malpractice action against a health care provider 
may be brought unless it is commenced within two years 
after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through 
the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered, the injury, whichever first occurs. . . . 
The adoption of this "discovery" rule givfes patients two years 
to bring a claim against a health care provider. This Court 
declared that the statute begins to run when "an injured person 
knows, or should know that he has suffered a legal injury." 
Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 147 (Uta^ i 1979). 
During his deposition on March 26, 1987, appellant Floyd 
acknowledged that in consultations conducted prior to the 1981 
operation, Dr. Lindem explained the anticipated hiatal hernia 
operation and the procedure that constitutes such operation. 
Following these consultations with Dr. Lindem, appellant 
understood the limited surgical procedure for hiatal hernia 
repair, also known as fundoplication: 
Q. Did you discuss with Dr. Lindem qn the first 
visit you had with him what he recommended in 
terms of surgery? 
A. No, I didn't ask him what he recommended. He 
told me what the surgery consisted of. 
Q. What did he tell you? 
A. Basically the same thing that Dr. Wilcox did. 
That the hernia was a tear between the esophagus 
and the stomach and what they would do is go in 
there and pull the stomach up ove^: the esophagus 
and tie it in. 
Q. What else did he tell you? 
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A. That's basically it. That was it. (Emphasis 
added.) 
(Record at 199; and Floyd Depo. at p. 83:14-24.) 
Dr. Lynn Wilcox, a gastroenterologist had diagnosed appel-
lants* hiatal hernia and referred the appellant to Dr. Lindem 
for consultation. Appellant testified that no mention was made 
of any additional procedures to correct other stomach problems 
by either Dr. Wilcox or Dr. Lindem. Appellant testified that 
his discussions with Dr. Lindem were restricted to the hiatal 
hernia and did not concern treatment or surgery for stomach 
ulcers: 
Q. You mentioned a repair of the hiatal hernia. 
A. That was all that was discussed. 
(Id. at 84:25; and 85:1.) Appellant also testified that he 
only authorized surgery to repair a tear between the esophagus 
and the stomach by pulling the stomach over the esophagus and 
tying it in. 
Q. Did you sign the consent form? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you give your consent to? 
A. I gave my consent to have a hiatal hernia 
repaired. 
(Id. at 88:6-9, 14-24; see also Record at 199.) 
In an interview check-up conducted three or four months 
after the December 1981 surgery, appellant testified that he 
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was upset about physical problems he was experiencing, as was 
his wife, who stated: "Damn it, Dr. Lindem, there's something 
wrong with him. What did you do to him?" (Record at 199; 
Floyd Depo. at 96:4-5.) Appellant testified that he then 
discovered that additional allegedly unauthorized surgery was 
performed. 
And she [Mrs. Floyd] said, Well, what all did you 
do to him? And that's when I found out about the 
other part. 
Q. When was that? 
A. That was approximately three and a half or four 
months after the surgery. 
Q. So that would have been perhaps March or perhaps 
as late as April of 1982? 
A. I suppose so, somewhere around tnere. 
Q. And Dr. Lindem at that time told you that he had 
done additional surgery? 
A. Yes, sir. She directly asked him what all they 
had done, and he said, [1] we repaired the 
hernia, [2] we removed a portion of his stomach 
that was covered with ulcer scars, tissue, [3] we 
cut the nerves in his stomach andj [4] opened up 
the bottom of his stomach so he cfrn process his 
food faster. (Emphasis added.) 
(Floyd Depo. at 96:8-21 and Record at 199.) 
Thus, appellant discovered in March or April of 1982 that 
Dr. Lindem had operated extensively on the entire stomach 
allegedly to treat gastric ulcer disease, aespite the lack of 
any discussion regarding such additional surgery. 
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It is clear that appellant could and did distinguish 
between the hiatal hernia operation and the allegedly 
unauthorized surgery in March or April of 1982. Indeed, 
appellant testified as follows: 
Q. In March or April of 1982, you learned for the 
first time that Dr. Lindem had removed part of 
your stomach? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had cut the nerves to your stomach? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And had done a procedure to make the food move 
through your stomach faster? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Surgery that you had never discussed with him? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Surgery you didn't ask him for? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And as far as you know, surgery you did not 
consent to? 
A. That I did not? 
Q. You did not consent to? 
A. That's right. 
(Record at 199 and Floyd Depo. at 97:2-18.) 
Under these circumstances, appellant acknowledges his 
discovery of a legal injury and its alleged cause more than two 
years prior to commencement of this action, which discovery 
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triggered the running of the applicaDie two year statute of 
limitations. 
B. Appellant's Claims Are Absolutely Time-Barred Because 
He Discovered The Cause Of Injury And Possibility Of 
Negligence More Than Two Years PJrior To Commencement 
Of This Action. 
Within the first three or four months after the December, 
1981 surgery, appellant immediately suffeted symptoms he had 
not expected to accompany the hiatal hernia operation. 
A. It was about — it was within th^ first three or 
four months after I had the surgery. 
Q. You hadn't expected to have diarrhea? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. That was getting continually worge? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You hadn't expected to have pain in your stomach? 
A, No. 
Q. And t h a t was g e t t i n g c o n t i n u a l l y ^/orse? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You hadn't expected to lose weight? 
A. No. 
Q. And now you were losing weight? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You hadn't expected to be depressed? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And you were getting depressed? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Did you discuss these problems with Dr. Lindem? 
A. Yes, sir, I did. 
(Floyd Depo. at 95:5-24.) 
In March or April of 1982, Appellant attributed the cause 
of the legal injuries and their related symptoms to allegedly 
unauthorized surgery or the allegedly negligent conduct of 
respondents: 
Q. Mr. Floyd, after your conversation with 
Dr. Lindem in March or April of 1982, did you 
have the understanding that the diarrhea you had 
and the upset stomach and your weight loss and 
the depression were due to Dr. Lindem1s perfor-
mance of the surgery which removed a portion of 
your stomach, cut the nerves to your stomach and 
sped the food through your stomach? 
A. Yes, sir. 
(Floyd Depo., pp. 97-98 lines 20-25, 1-2.) Because appellant 
discovered a legal injury and its alleged cause and the 
possibility of negligence in March or April of 1982, nothing 
more was required to commence the running of the two year 
statute of limitations for medical malpractice. Foil v. 
Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979). 
The fact that appellant had discovered a legal injury, its 
cause and the possibility of negligence is further supported by 
appellant's September 1982 visit to Dr. Wilcox. In September 
of 1982, appellant returned to Dr. Wilcox because of continuing 
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health difficulties. Appellant told Dr. Wilcox about the sym-
ptoms he was experiencing and explained that Dr. Lindem had 
told appellant that the problems were common for that type of 
surgery. Dr. Wilcox forcefully stated that appellant "shouldn't 
have that kind of problem with fundoplication [hiatal hernia 
surgery]." (Floyd Depo. at 99:14-15 and Record at 199.) 
Appellant and his wife then told Dr. Wilcox that Dr. Lindem 
had performed surgical procedures in addition to the authorized 
hiatal hernia operating: 
A, He said, no, you shouldn't have that kind of 
problem with fundoplication or whatever it is. I 
said, Well that's not all that was done. He 
said, Yeah, it was. I said, No, sir, it wasn't. 
My wife started getting upset. He said, It 
wasn't all that was done? And my wife told him 
what Dr. Lindem had told us, and ihe said, No, 
they didn't do that. And she said, Well that's 
what we were told. 
Well, Dr. Wilcox called Dr. Lindem's office, I 
don't know who he talked to there, whether it was 
Dr. Lindem or his nurse or whatever, but 
evidently they were reading him the reports and 
he was listening and he said, Okay, thank you 
very much and he hung up and looked at me and he 
said, Well, I guess you was right, I didn't know 
they done all of that. (Emphasis added.) 
(Record at 99:14-25; 100:1-2.) 
After performing diagnostic tests in September, 1982, 
Dr. Wilcox told appellant that he had a "rapidly accelerated 
gastric emptying rate, consistent with dumping syndrome," (Id. 
at 100:16-18) a problem that appellant had been told he should 
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not have had with fundoplication [hiatal hernia surgery]. 
(Floyd Depo. at 99:14-15.) 
Because plaintiff discovered his injuries well before 
November of 1983, the notice of intent to commence litigation 
dated November 27th, 1985 was not timely filed and the 
appellant's stale claims are absolutely time-barred by the two 
year statute of limitations as a matter of law. 
C• It Is No Defense To Application Of The Statute Of 
Limitations That (1) The Doctors Involved Indicated 
The Appellant's Condition May Improve With Time Or (2) 
That The Appellant Did Not Know The Full Extent Of His 
Injuries. 
It is no defense for waiting over three years to file a 
notice of intent that a physician indicated that a patient's 
condition would improve over time or that the patient does not 
comprehend the full extent of injury. In Hargett v. Limberg, 
598 F. Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 801 
F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1986), the court explained: 
Under Foil v. Ballinger, and its progeny, a legal 
determination of negligence is not necessary to start 
the statute of limitations. Rather, the crucial 
question is whether the plaintiff was aware of the 
facts that would lead a reasonable person to conclude 
that he may have a cause of action against the health 
care provider. Those facts include the existence of 
an injury, its cause and the possibility of negligence. 
Id. at 155. (Citations omitted.) 
In Magoc v. Hooker, 796 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1986), the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Utah District Court 
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ruling that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the two-year 
medical malpractice statute of limitation^. 
[P] laintif f s * counsel argues that [pllaintiff did not] 
know the full extent of defendants* negligence, which 
was only learned later. The district! court rejected 
his argument, as do we. To adopt such reasoning 
would, in practical effect, wipe out the statute. 
Id. at 379 (emphasis in original.) See a}Lso, Hove v. McMaster, 
621 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980) (holding there is no requirement to 
wait for the pain to be diagnosed before the two-year statute 
of limitations will bar a medical malpractice action); and 
Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah, 1982) (holding belief 
condition complained of may be temporary father than permanent 
did not prevent application of two-year statute of limitations 
to bar plaintiff's claim). 
Even though appellant argues that he did not know the full 
extent of alleged unauthorized surgery and related injuries 
until much later, the two year statute of limitations would 
still apply to bar his claim. Appellant testified that he 
desired surgery to correct a long-standing problem diagnosed to 
be a hiatal hernia which permitted food to reflux from the 
stomach up into the esophagus, causing heartburn. Appellant 
knew the hiatal hernia surgical procedure tor correcting this 
problem did not involve removing part of hts stomach, cutting 
stomach nerves or enlarging the stomach opening to his intes-
tines. Nevertheless, appellant discovered the performance of 
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these surgical procedures in 1982 and also learned that the 
injuries he had allegedly suffered were not a result of the 
authorized hiatal hernia operation. Under these circumstances, 
appellant "was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable 
person to conclude that he may have a cause of action against a 
health care provider." Hargett, 598 F. Supp. at 155. 
Count III of plaintiff's Complaint, alleging fraudulent 
concealment likewise lacks merit. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-4(1)(b) (1987) specifically requires: 
In an action where it is alleged that a patient 
has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the 
part of a health care provider because that health 
care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently 
conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be 
barred unless commenced within one year after the 
plaintiff or patient discover, or through the use of 
reasonable diligence, should have discovered the 
fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs. 
Appellant, at the very latest, discovered that the physical 
problems he was experiencing would not resolve without 
additional surgery in September of 1984, more than on year 
before commencement of this action. (Record at 173, 1[ 9.) 
Moreover, appellant candidly admits that respondents explained 
the nature of treatment provided and surgery performed. 
Accordingly, the only issue of concealment was whether 
appellant authorized such treatment and that information could 
not be concealed from appellant. 
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POINT II 
APPELLANT'S ATTEMPT TO MANUFACTURE AN ISSUE 
OF FACT SHOULD BE DISREGARDED. 
A. Appellant's Post Deposition Contradictory Affidavit 
Cannot Raise An Issue Of Fact. 
At his deposition, appellant acknowledged that in 1982 he 
discovered that (1) defendants allegedly performed unauthorized 
surgery; (2) unexpected symptoms he was experiencing were 
attributed to such unauthorized surgery; ^nd (3) the injuries 
complained of allegedly resulted from negligence of respondents. 
(Statement of Facts IHf 2 through 12.) In connection with 
respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, appellant attempted 
to raise an issue of fact by stating, in aln affidavit, that he 
had no knowledge of the injury, its cause or the possibility of 
negligence until 1985. In testing the credibility of such 
post-deposition contradictory statement, this Court declared: 
As a matter of general evidence l|aw, a deposition 
is generally a more reliable means of ascertaining the 
truth than an affidavit, since a deponbnt is subject 
to cross-examination and an affiant isj not. . . . But 
when a party takes a clear position in: a deposition, 
that is not modified on cross-examination, he may not 
thereafter raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit 
which contradicts his deposition, unless he can 
provide an explanation of the discrepancy. A contrary 
rule would undermine the utility of summary judgment 
as a means for screening out sham issues of fact. 
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983) (citations 
omitted). Appellant's acknowledgment that he discovered an 
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injury, its cause and the possibility of negligence in 1982 
were not modified on cross-examination, nor has any explanation 
for the post deposition discrepancy been provided. 
In Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979), this 
Court declared that the plaintiff "cannot rely on mere 
allegations or denials of their pleadings to avoid a summary 
judgment, but must set forth specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial." Genuine issues of fact cannot 
be created through contradiction. Such appears to be the 
situation in this case. The trial court properly rejected 
appellant's attempt to manufacture an issue of fact. 
B. The Statute Of Limitations Began To Run In 1982, 
Regardless Of Concealment, Because Appellant Learned 
Of Information That Would Lead To Discovery Of The 
Cause Of Action Through Diligence. 
In Miller v. A. H. Robins Co., Inc., 766 F.2d 1102, 1106-07 
(7th Cir. 1985), the court, ruling upon the application of a 
similar medical malpractice statute of limitations, held that 
"[w]hen a plaintiff learns of information that would lead to 
the discovery of the cause of action through diligence, the 
statute of limitations begins to run regardless of concealment." 
In Miller the plaintiff had a Dalkon Shield inserted into 
her uterus in 1972. In 1974, the plaintiff received emergency 
medical care for a pelvic infection. In connection with this 
treatment, the Dalkon Shield was removed. In 1981, when the 
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plaintiff experienced difficulties becoming pregnant, she 
consulted a physician who told her that he believed that the 
plaintiff's infertility was due to the 1974 pelvic infection 
which was probably related to use of the Oalkon Shield 
intrauterine device. 
The plaintiff testified in her deposition that her treating 
physician told her in 1974 that the Dalkon Shield was a possi-
ble cause of her infection. The plaintiff did not commence her 
cause of action against health care providers until 1981. When 
faced with a motion for summary judgment based on the Indiana 
Medical Malpractice Statute of Limitations which begins to run 
from the date the plaintiff "knew or should have discovered 
that she suffered an injury or impingement and that it was 
caused by the product or act of another," plaintiff offered an 
affidavit stating that in 1974 her treating physicians did not 
advise her of any connection between her illness and her use of 
the Dalkon Shield. Under these circumstances, the court ruled 
that: 
The parties cannot thwart the purpose pf Rule 56 by 
creating issues of fact through affidavits that 
contradict their own depositions. . . . When a 
plaintiff learns of information that would lead to the 
discovery of the cause of action through diligence, 
the statute of limitations begins to run regardless of 
concealment. 
Id. at 1104 and 1106-07. The Miller court also explained: 
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Persons who know or should have discovered both the 
injury and the cause "have a fair opportunity to 
investigate available sources of relevant information 
and to decide whether to bring their claims in court 
within the time limitations in the statute. The 
notion of a "fair opportunity to investigate" suggests 
that discovering "the cause" is something less than 
possessing irrefutable proof of causation. The 
doctor's statement, by itself, informed [plaintiff] 
. . . of the possible causal connection, and should 
have prompted [plaintiff] . . . either to contact a 
lawyer or to conduct her own inquiry. (citations 
omitted.) 
Miller, 766 F.2d at 1105. 
The instant case is similar to Miller in several respects. 
First, appellant Floyd learned of information (performance of 
allegedly unauthorized surgical procedures) that would lead to 
the discovery of a possible cause of action through diligence. 
Second, appellant had a fair opportunity to investigate 
available sources of relevant information and to decide whether 
to bring his claim within the time limitation (Dr. Wilcox told 
appellant that the injuries he suffered were not related to a 
hiatal hernia operation). Finally, appellant Floyd possessed 
sufficient knowledge of possible causal connection between 
injuries and his 1981 operation to have prompted him to either 
contact a lawyer or conduct his own inquiry. 
On all material issues relative to the application of 
Section 78-14-4, there is no dispute as to the crucial facts 
relied upon by the trial court in granting respondents' motion 
for summary judgment. Accordingly, appellant "cannot thwart 
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the purpose of Rule 56 by creating issues of fact through 
affidavits that contradict [his] own deposition." Webster, 675 
P.2d at 1104. 
POINT III 
THE CASE OF FOIL V. BALLINGER IS CONSISTENT 
WITH THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER IN ^HE INSTANT 
CASE. 
This Court declared in Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 
(Utah 1979) that the "statute [of limitations for medical 
malpractice] begins to run when an injured person knows or 
should know that he suffered a legal injury." Foil, 601 P.2d 
at 147. This Court carefully safeguarded against tardy claims 
by imposing "the requirement that a personj exercise reasonable 
diligence in determining the nature and cause of his or her 
injury." Id. at 149. 
In the instant case, appellant testified that he only 
discussed and consented to hiatal hernia surgery which he 
clearly understood to be simple repair of a tear between the 
esophagus and the stomach, involving "pull[ing] the stomach up 
over the esophagus and [tying] it in." (Record at 199; and 
Floyd Depo. at 83:14-24.) Three to four months after surgery 
and more than two years prior to commencement of this action 
appellant discovered that the surgery performed was much more 
extensive than the scope of discussions and alleged consent. 
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The surgery involved removal of part of appellant's stomach, 
severing stomach nerves and acceleration of his digestive 
process through surgical enlargement of the stomach opening to 
the duodenum, all of which were explained to appellant. (Id. 
at 199; and 96:17-21; 97:20-25 and 98:1-2.) 
The facts of Foil are markedly distinguished from the facts 
of the instant case. In Foi1, the plaintiff was not apprised 
of the cause of her injuries until a workmen's compensation 
medical panel issued a written report concerning plaintiff's 
medical condition. In Foil, the plaintiff was simply unaware 
of any act of negligence by an expert. In contrast, appellant 
in the instant case discovered within three to four months of 
the injury that allegedly unauthorized surgery had been per-
formed. In addition, by April of 1982, appellant testified 
that he attributed the cause of his injuries and related sym-
ptoms to the allegedly unauthorized surgery. Thus, the trial 
court's decision in this case is completely consistent with the 
holding in Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979). 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT'S IMPROPERLY RAISED CONSTITUTIONAL 
ATTACK ON THE LIMITATIONS PROVISIONS OF THE 
HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT CANNOT BE 
CONSIDERED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
In his brief, appellant, for the first time, challenges the 
constitutionality of the Section 78-14-4 of the Utah Health 
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Care Malpractice Act, alleging that the statute of limitations 
contained therein violates appellant's ribfhts to equal protec-
tion, due process and access to the courts. See United States 
Constitution, Amendment XIV, and Utah Constitution, Art. I, 
§§ 11 and 24. Appellant also argues, for the first time, that 
the statute of limitations constitutes special legislation in 
favor of health care providers. 
Utah courts have strongly and consistently held that issues 
raised for the first time on appeal cannot; be considered. In 
Insley Mfg. Corp. v. Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 
(Utah 1986), this court declared that an i|ssue not raised in 
the pleadings or at trial cannot be raised for the first time 
on appeal. This court also noted that the| record must clearly 
show that an issue was "timely presented to the trial court in 
a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thelreon; we cannot 
assume that it was properly raised." Franklin Financial v. New 
Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). Thus, 
if a party fails to present an issue to thfe trial court, he or 
she will have "waived the right to raise it" on appeal. Utah 
County v. Brown, 672 P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 198^,. In summary, 
w[i]t is axiomatic that defenses and claims not raised by the 
parties in the trial [court] cannot be considered for the first 
time on appeal. Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 
1983). 
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In the instant case, appellant restricted his arguments to 
the application of Section 78-14-4 and did not raise any of the 
constitutional arguments enumerated in Points V through VII of 
appellant's brief. The record is completely void of any refer-
ence to appellant's newly raised constitutional arguments. 
Accordingly, appellant's constitutional arguments cannot be 
considered by this Court. 
Even though appellant's constitutional arguments are not 
proper subjects of appellate review, such arguments are 
flawed. This court has strongly and consistently upheld the 
constitutionality of the provisions of the Act and the 
limitations periods set forth therein "to protect and insure 
the continued availability of health care services to the 
public. . . ." Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 
P.2d 30, 31-32 (Utah 1981). Se<e also Yates v. Vernal Family 
Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980); McGuire v. University 
of Utah Medical Center, 603 P.2d 786 (Utah 1979); and Vealey v. 
Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah 1978). 
In Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30 
(Utah 1981), this court upheld that constitutionality of the 
Medical Malpractice Act and its statute of limitations, 
concluding that the Act does not violate constitutional rights 
of due process and equal protection; nor does the Act violate 
prohibitions against special laws. This Court noted that: 
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[T]he Act was premised on 
insure the continued avail 
services to the public. . 
exercised its prerogative 
shortening of the statute 
insure the continued avail 
care services. In the abs 
contrary, we conclude that 
determination is not so ar 
to exceed constitutional p 
the need to;protect and 
ability of health care 
. . The legislature 
in determining that the 
of limitation . . . would 
ability of Adequate health 
ence of a showing to the 
the legislature's 
bitrary or Unreasonable as 
rohibitions. 
* * * 
Having concluded that the classification is 
reasonable, it follows that the limitation statute is 
not constitutionally defective as a "^pecial law." 
Allen, 635 P.2d at 32. (Emphasis added.) 
This Court has declared that Article l|, Section ll1 of the 
Utah Constitution does not preclude the legislature from 
prescribing a statute of limitations for time within which to 
bring a cause of action. Masich v. United] States Smelting, 
Refining & Mining Co. , 113 Utah 2d 101, 19|l P.2d 612 (1948). 
Indeed, "certain individual rights and remedies can be made to 
yield to the public good." Masich, 191 P.2d at 624. Thus, 
because there is nothing under the facts o£ the instant case to 
distinguish the application of Section 78-14-4 from the 
Article I, Section 11 provides: "All cou 
and every person, for an injury done to hi 
property or reputation, shall have remedy 
which shall be administered without denial 
delay; and no person shall be barred from 
defending before any tribunal in this stat 
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a 
ts shall be open, 
m in his person, 
tj)y due course of law, 
or unnecessary 
rosecuting or 
, by himself or 
arty." 
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application of any other constitutionally permissible statute 
of limitations, Section 78-14-4 should be upheld as valid 
legislative response to specific public needs. See Allen, 
supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court properly concluded that appellant 
discovered or through the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered that he had sustained an injury and that 
the injury was caused by negligent action more than two years 
before he commenced an action against respondents. Appellant 
knew of alleged unauthorized surgery and attributed the cause 
of his injuries to such surgery in 1982. Nevertheless, he did 
not commence this action until November of 1985. Appellant 
cannot now raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit which 
contradicts his deposition to defeat application of Section 
78-14-4 because a "contrary rule would undermine the utility of 
summary judgment as a means for screening out sham issues of 
fact." Webster, 675 P.2d at 1172-73. Likewise appellant's 
flawed constitutional arguments should not be considered by 
this court for the first time on appeal. 
For these reasons, respondents respectfully urge this Court 
to affirm the decision of the district court, thereby 
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dismissing appellant's cause of action for failure to commence 
his action within the time prescribed by law. 
DATED this T * day of JWXAJL _ / 1988. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Ell iof t f t J . W i l l i a m s 
Larry\R) . Ijaycock 
A t t o r n e y s jfor Responden t s 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT DF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES FLOYD, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v . 
WESTERN SURGICAL ASSOCIATES, 
INC., MARTIN C. LINDEM, JR., 
M.D., LYNN L. WILCOX, M.D., 
and ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 86-2223 
Judge Ricnard Moffat 
The defendants', Western Surgical Associates, Inc., 
Martin C. Lindem, Jr., M.D., Lynn L. Wilcox, M.D. and 
St. Mark's Hospital, Motion For Summary Judgment having come 
on for argument on June 26, 1987, before ^he Honorable 
Richard Moffat, plaintiff's counsel being represented by 
Clayton Fairbourn, and defendants being represented by Elliott 
Williams, Anthony Eyre, and Bruce Garner, the Court having 
000186 
heard argument on the matter and being fully advised in the 
premises, now finds the following: 
THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW, the plaintiff discovered or 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered that he had sustained an injury and that the 
injury was caused by negligent action more than two years 
before he commenced an action against the health care provi-
ders; consequently, his claims of medical malpractice are 
barred by the statute of limitations prescribed in Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1953, as amen-
ded) . 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
the defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment is granted, and that 
the above-entitled action is dismissed with prejudice pursuant 
to Rule 56, each party to bear their own costs. 
DATED this^^g> day of July, 1987. 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
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M.D. • 
h e r e i n ; t h a t she served the a t tached O r d e r 
(Case No. 86-2223 , S a l t Lake [County) upon the parties 
l i s t e d below by p lac ing a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy thereof in an envelope 
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D . C l a y t o n F a i r b o u r n Gary D. S t o t t 
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and causing the same t o be mai led , f i r s t c l a s s , postage p r e p a i d , on the 
9 ^ d a y of J u l y 1987. 
Lynn Frear 
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